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By Bob Kuhn
WHAT IF you were free to believe as you chose, but were
never allowed to act on that belief nor meet with others who shared your
view?
Would you have religious freedom?
In the 2001 decision in the case of Trinity Western
University vs. the B.C. College of Teachers, the Supreme Court of Canada
said:
“Neither freedom of religion nor the guarantee
against discrimination . . . is absolute. The proper place to draw
the line is generally between belief and conduct. The freedom to hold
beliefs is broader than the freedom to act on them.”
Drawing a line
As the courts and the government seek to draw a line
defining religious freedoms in an increasingly secular world, religious
groups are wondering about the true freedom to practice their religion in
this country.
Section 2(a) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in
Canada only says individuals are granted “freedom of conscience and
religion”; a right to a belief system.
In reality, section 2(a) would be virtually meaningless
without the ability to act on one’s faith. The Charter can only
mean that individuals have the ability to express their faith openly,
acting and engaging with others in way consistent with their beliefs.
It has been recognized that there are limits on this
expression; and the courts are the referees when secular and religious
values compete. Lately, the spectrum of combat has engaged several areas of
life – from school to work to family life.
Prolife
In January, two Human Rights Commission complaints
received rulings concerning university clubs. Both cases involved
situations where prolife university students were denied club status, and
the opportunity to present their views on their campus.
While the Human Rights Tribunal ruled that the case
involving the Capilano College club can be heard, the club at UBC in
Kelowna was not as fortunate.
The tribunal ruled the Kelowna students couldn’t
claim discrimination in their situation, because the prolife position is
not specifically a religious position. It would seem the club might
have been more successful if it restricted its membership to only members
of a certain faith, and no one else.
This begs the question: is the tribunal saying your
religious beliefs can only be protected as long as no one else disagrees
with you?
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Yet the field of abortion debate is not the only place
we are seeing attempts to re-categorize what some may consider religious
issues into secular ones.
Employees
In a case from Scotland, the House of Lords recently
ruled that clergy are employees rather than office-holders of the church.
This is significant, because it means public law should
apply to them – and public law forbids employees to be discriminated
against on the basis of such things as gender and sexual orientation.
The outcome may be significant to Canadian courts attempting to deal
with claims of religious freedom.
What about religions which only hire pastors or priests
who are male? What about churches which only hire those who ascribe
to their belief systems regarding homosexuality? Could these policies be
deemed discriminatory? The ability of a faith to govern who is
allowed to lead their church seems fundamental to their freedom to practice
religion.
Family
Like the campus clubs and churches, the court has
looked at battling values within the family context as well.
The Supreme Court recently ruled on the relationship
between secular and religious divorce. This case concerned the
granting of the Jewish religious divorce, known as get.
In the Jewish faith, it is up to the husband alone to
decide whether a Jewish divorce may be granted. If he elects not to
provide it, the couple can obtain a civil divorce – but the wife may
never remarry in the Jewish faith.
In this case, the wife wanted the court to enforce her
husband’s prior agreement to grant her a get. The court recognized that this decision was a moral
one, not a legal decision. The husband claimed that forcing him to
agree was a violation of his Charter rights to freedom of religion.
The court decided the husband could not use the Charter
to escape his contractual obligations. The distinguishing element
here was that the husband had previously signed an agreement in which he
had agreed to the get.
In agreeing under contract, the husband had elected to make a moral
duty a legal one.
While this distinction is certainly valid, we have yet
another example of the court secularizing a decision which was otherwise
understood to be religious.
As the line between sacred and secular blurs further,
beliefs may soon be rendered either illegal to express – or so
private as to be invisible to the world around us.
Bob Kuhn is an Abbotsford lawyer.
April 2008
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